There is no official, AICPA-issued SOC 2 controls list. The AICPA publishes trust services criteria and points of focus, and your organisation designs the controls that meet them. What follows is the next best thing: the controls auditors commonly test in practice, organised by criteria family, each with its typical owner, frequency, evidence artefact and the exception it most often maps to.
| Criteria family | Working controls covered here | Where first-timers trip |
|---|---|---|
| Governance and people (CC1, CC2) | Roles, policies, oversight, screening, training, joiner and leaver process | Paper policies with no evidence of operation |
| Risk and monitoring (CC3, CC4, CC5) | Risk register, fraud and change assessment, internal review, corrective actions, controls matrix | Stale register, findings never closed |
| Access (CC6) | MFA, unique accounts, provisioning, access reviews, encryption, malware protection, physical access | Leavers retaining access, rubber-stamped reviews |
| System operations (CC7) | Vulnerability management, logging, incident response and testing | Scans run, findings never remediated |
| Change management (CC8) | Code review, environment separation, emergency change, hardening standards | Self-approved releases |
| Risk mitigation (CC9) | Vendor reviews, vendor SOC 2 report collection, continuity planning, recovery testing | Backups that are never restore-tested |
| Availability (A-series, if in scope) | Uptime and capacity monitoring, backup monitoring, restore tests | No evidence anyone watches the monitors |
| Processing integrity (PI-series, if in scope) | Input validation, reconciliations, failed-job handling | Failed jobs nobody reviews |
| Confidentiality (C-series, if in scope) | Classification, NDAs, retention and disposal | A retention schedule with no deletion evidence |
| Privacy (P-series, if in scope) | Privacy notice, consent records, request handling, breach notification | A notice that no longer matches actual data use |
Why listen to us
Atoro is an Irish AI governance and cyber compliance consultancy for software companies, and the first consultancy in Europe certified against ISO/IEC 42001 (certificate AIMS-AT-120224, issued by A-LIGN under ANAB accreditation). Atoro states it has delivered more than 200 certifications (atoro.io, checked 08-08-2026). We prepare software companies for SOC 2 examinations, so the catalogue below reflects what auditors actually ask for, not what a template says they should.
One paragraph of orientation, then this page stays at control level
The AICPA does not publish a controls list. It publishes the Trust Services Criteria, and points of focus that “represent important characteristics of the criteria”; the document states plainly that using the criteria “does not require an assessment of whether each point of focus is addressed” (AICPA, TSP section 100, par. .03-.04, 2017 edition with revised points of focus 2022, accessed 19-08-2026). The five categories, the CC1 to CC9 criteria structure and the full argument against the idea of an official checklist are covered in our companion guide, SOC 2 requirements, so we will not repeat them here. This page works one level down: the controls companies actually implement, which are practitioner practice, not AICPA requirements. Where we describe what auditors expect, that is market practice observed across SOC 2 examinations and audit-prep work, not an AICPA rule.
How to read this catalogue
Each control below carries four fields. Owner: the role that usually holds the control in a software company; assign a named person, not a team. Frequency: how often the control normally runs. Frequencies are common practice, not AICPA-set rules; your control design sets the cadence and the auditor tests whether you kept to it. Evidence artefact: the record an auditor will ask to see. Common exception: the finding this control most often produces, drawn from exception patterns auditors report in the market (per the SERP research record for this cluster: soc2auditors.org’s evidence and gap columns and Scrut’s exception-risk triage, checked 19-08-2026). If you take one thing from this page, take the evidence column: a control without an artefact is a claim, not a control.
Governance and people controls (CC1 and CC2)
| Control | Typical owner | Typical frequency | Evidence artefact | Common exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defined security roles and reporting lines | Leadership | Reviewed annually | Org chart and role descriptions | Roles exist on paper, no evidence of oversight |
| Approved policy suite (security, acceptable use, data handling) | Security lead | Annual review and sign-off | Versioned policies with approval record | Policies unsigned or stale |
| Leadership or board review of security | Leadership | At least annual | Meeting minutes with actions | Reviews minuted but actions never tracked |
| Background checks for new hires | HR | Per hire | Screening records | Checks missing for early employees |
| Security awareness training | HR or IT lead | At hire, then annually | Completion records | Training runs, completion never enforced |
| Onboarding and offboarding checklists | HR and IT lead | Per joiner and leaver | Completed checklists tied to tickets | Leavers processed late |
Risk and monitoring controls (CC3, CC4 and CC5)
| Control | Typical owner | Typical frequency | Evidence artefact | Common exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Risk register tied to commitments and system requirements | Security lead | Reviewed at least annually and on significant change (common practice) | Risk register with scoring and owners | Register stale or generic |
| Fraud risk considered in the assessment | Leadership | With each assessment | Fraud section in the risk register | Fraud never discussed |
| Change impact assessment | Security lead | Per major change (new product, new region, acquisition) | Change review notes | Assessment skipped during fast growth |
| Internal audit or structured self-assessment | Security lead | Annual | Internal review report and findings log | Findings raised, never closed |
| Corrective action tracking | Control owners | Per finding | Action log with closure evidence | The same exceptions recur year on year |
| Controls matrix mapping each control to the criteria it addresses | Security lead | Updated whenever scope changes | The matrix itself | Controls mapped to criteria they do not actually address |
Access controls (CC6)
| Control | Typical owner | Typical frequency | Evidence artefact | Common exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Multi-factor authentication on remote and administrative access | IT lead | Continuous | Identity provider policy export, MFA coverage report | Gaps on service accounts and legacy apps |
| Unique user accounts, no shared credentials | IT lead | Continuous | Account listing | Shared admin accounts survive from the early days |
| Joiner, mover and leaver provisioning tied to HR events | IT lead and HR | Per event | Tickets linked to HR records | Leaver access removed days or weeks late |
| Periodic access reviews | IT lead and system owners | Quarterly (common practice) | Signed review records | Reviews rubber-stamped without checking |
| Encryption of data at rest and in transit | Engineering lead | Continuous | Key management and TLS configuration evidence | Legacy data stores left unencrypted |
| Malware prevention and detection on endpoints (CC6.8) | IT lead | Continuous | Endpoint protection deployment and alert reports | Coverage gaps on contractor devices |
| Restricted physical access to sensitive locations (CC6.4) | Office lead; cloud provider reliance | Continuous | Badge logs; data centre assurance reports from the cloud provider | Badge access lists never reviewed |
System operations controls (CC7)
| Control | Typical owner | Typical frequency | Evidence artefact | Common exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability scanning with remediation tracking | Security lead | Monthly or quarterly (common practice) | Scan reports plus remediation tickets | Scans run on schedule, findings never fixed |
| Centralised logging and alerting | Engineering lead | Continuous | Log retention configuration, sample alerts | Logs exist, nobody reviews the alerts |
| Incident response plan with defined roles | Security lead | Reviewed annually | Incident response plan | Plan written, never tested |
| Tabletop or simulated incident exercise | Security lead | Annual (common practice) | Exercise notes and resulting actions | First test happens inside the audit window |
| Security event triage through to incident determination | Security lead | Per event | Triage and investigation records | Events closed without analysis |
Change management controls (CC8)
| Control | Typical owner | Typical frequency | Evidence artefact | Common exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Code review and approval before merge | Engineering lead | Per change | Pull request approvals | Self-approved releases |
| Separation of development and production environments | Engineering lead | Continuous | Environment and access configuration | Developers deploying straight to production |
| Emergency change process | Engineering lead | Per event | Emergency change record with retrospective approval | Emergencies used to bypass review |
| Documented hardening or baseline configuration standard | Engineering lead | Reviewed annually | Hardening standard plus baseline configuration | The standard exists in someone’s head, not in a document |
Vendor and continuity controls (CC9)
| Control | Typical owner | Typical frequency | Evidence artefact | Common exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vendor risk assessment at onboarding | Security lead or procurement | Per vendor | Vendor review records | Vendors approved with no review at all |
| Collection and review of critical vendors’ SOC 2 reports, including any complementary user entity controls | Security lead | Annually per critical vendor (common practice) | Vendor reports plus review notes | Reports collected, never read |
| Business continuity and disaster recovery plan | Engineering or operations lead | Reviewed annually | BCP and DR document | Plan copied from a template, never adapted |
| Recovery testing | Engineering lead | Annual test (common practice) | Restore test or DR exercise report | Backups run for years, restores never tested |
Controls for the optional categories
If availability, processing integrity, confidentiality or privacy sit inside your scope, auditors commonly test controls like these alongside the security controls above. Scoping itself is covered in SOC 2 requirements; this is the working layer only.
| Category | Control | Typical owner | Typical frequency | Evidence artefact | Common exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Availability | Uptime monitoring and alerting | Engineering lead | Continuous | Status dashboards, alert history | Alerts fire into an unmonitored channel |
| Availability | Backup success monitoring and restore testing | Engineering lead | Continuous monitoring; periodic restore tests | Backup logs, restore test records | Backups green, restores never attempted |
| Processing integrity | Input validation on critical processing | Engineering lead | Continuous | Validation rules, rejected-input logs | Bad data discovered by customers first |
| Processing integrity | Reconciliation of processed output | Operations lead | Per run or daily | Reconciliation reports with sign-off | Reconciliations run, output never reviewed |
| Processing integrity | Failed-job alerting and reprocessing | Engineering lead | Per event | Failure alerts and reprocessing records | Failed jobs silently dropped |
| Confidentiality | Data classification scheme | Security lead | Reviewed annually | Classification standard, labelled data stores | Scheme published, data never classified |
| Confidentiality | Confidentiality agreements for staff and contractors | HR | Per engagement | Signed agreements | Contractors working without NDAs |
| Confidentiality | Retention and disposal schedule with executed deletion | Security lead | Per schedule | Disposal and destruction records | Retention schedule exists, deletion never evidenced |
| Privacy | Current, accurate privacy notice | Legal or security lead | Reviewed on change | Published notice with version history | Notice no longer matches actual data use |
| Privacy | Consent records where consent is relied on | Engineering lead | Continuous | Consent records | Consent assumed, never recorded |
| Privacy | Data subject request handling | Legal or security lead | Per request | Request log with response records | Requests answered informally, nothing logged |
| Privacy | Breach and incident notification process, including commitments to notify vendors, data subjects and regulators | Security lead | Per incident; reviewed annually | Notification procedure, incident notifications sent | Commitments in contracts nobody has mapped |
Common failure points
Cookie-cutter evidence. The control is copied from a template, so the evidence a company produces does not match the control as written. Auditors test the control you described, not the one you meant to describe.
Controls that only exist during the window. Evidence appears in month one and month twelve of the observation period and nowhere between. Auditors commonly expect evidence generated across the whole period. Treat any fixed staleness threshold you read online, such as a six-month limit on risk register age, as the house rule of a particular firm, not an AICPA rule (market practice note per the cluster SERP record, checked 19-08-2026).
Self-approval. The person who makes the change approves the change. This shows up in code release, access grants and vendor onboarding, and it is one of the fastest routes to an exception.
Findings that never close. Internal reviews and scans generate findings; nobody owns remediation; the same issue appears in the next examination as a repeat exception. Exception patterns reported across the market cluster on access reviews, vulnerability management and change approvals (Scrut exception triage, market practice, checked 19-08-2026).
Requirements people assume exist but do not
A fixed number of controls. No AICPA control count exists. Figures like 80 to 100 controls circulate in vendor content without any source (recorded as unsourced in the cluster SERP record, checked 19-08-2026); they describe someone’s template, not a requirement.
Individual assessment of every point of focus. The AICPA’s own text says using the criteria “does not require an assessment of whether each point of focus is addressed” (TSP section 100, par. .04, accessed 19-08-2026). Points of focus are guidance, not requirements.
Prescribed tools. No mandate exists for a particular platform, scanner, password manager or training provider. The control is the requirement; the tool is your choice.
One-to-one mapping of controls to points of focus. Not required; points of focus are not separate controls (market framing consistent with Bright Defense’s definitional treatment, checked 19-08-2026).
For the wider debunk list, including the fact that SOC 2 is an attestation rather than a certification and that the four categories beyond security are scope choices, see SOC 2 requirements.
FAQs
Is there an official SOC 2 controls list?
No. The AICPA publishes the Trust Services Criteria and points of focus, not a list of controls to implement (TSP section 100, par. .02-.04, accessed 19-08-2026). Each organisation identifies and designs controls that meet the criteria for its own system. Any numbered list you find online, including this page, is practitioner practice, not an AICPA issuance.
How many controls does SOC 2 require?
There is no fixed number. You implement enough controls to meet the criteria that fall inside your scope, and the auditor tests those controls rather than counting them. Figures such as 80 to 100 controls circulate in vendor content without sourcing; treat them as descriptions of particular templates, not rules.
Are the AICPA points of focus mandatory?
No. The AICPA describes points of focus as important characteristics of the criteria that may assist management when designing and operating controls, and states that using the criteria does not require assessing whether each point of focus is addressed (TSP section 100, par. .03-.04, accessed 19-08-2026). They are guidance you can customise or set aside where they do not fit your circumstances.
What should we hand a customer who asks for our SOC 2 controls list?
Hand them your SOC 2 report, not a list. The report is the attested artefact: it describes your system and carries an independent auditor’s opinion on your controls, which is what the customer’s security review actually needs. An internal controls list is a working document and carries no independent weight. If you are between report periods, your auditor can advise on bridging documentation.
Who should own SOC 2 controls in a software company?
A named person should own each control, typically the IT lead for access and endpoint controls, the engineering lead for change management and operations controls, HR for screening and training, and leadership for governance and risk. Shared ownership by a team is where controls quietly stop running, because nobody produces the evidence. In a small company one person may hold several controls; that is fine as long as each control has exactly one owner.
How often are SOC 2 controls tested?
In a Type 1 examination the auditor tests whether controls are suitably designed as of a specified date, often shortened to “a point in time” in SOC 2 discussions; in a Type 2 examination the auditor tests operating effectiveness across a specified period and describes the tests and results in the report (TSP section 100, par. .11, accessed 19-08-2026). The cadence of each control itself, quarterly access reviews or annual training, is your design choice. The auditor then tests whether the evidence shows you kept to it across the period.
Can we copy a SOC 2 controls list from another company?
You can use one as a starting point, but you cannot adopt it wholesale. In a SOC 2 engagement the criteria are interpreted against your commitments and system requirements, meaning the promises in your contracts and service agreements, not someone else’s (TSP section 100, par. .13-.14, accessed 19-08-2026). Copied controls usually fail on evidence: they describe a company you are not, so the records you produce never quite match.
Do we need a compliance platform to run these controls?
No platform is required by the AICPA or by the attestation standards. A platform earns its cost by automating evidence collection, tracking control owners and flagging gaps before the auditor finds them; Atoro’s partner platform is Drata, but spreadsheets and disciplined ticketing can carry a first examination. What you cannot skip is the evidence itself, however you collect it.
The honest next step
If you are building this catalogue for a first examination, the fastest working session is a control-by-control gap review against the criteria in your scope: which of these controls you already run, which run without evidence, and which are missing entirely. That review is what Atoro’s SOC 2 readiness work starts with; you can read about it on our SOC 2 service page. The guide’s usefulness is the pitch: if the tables above showed you gaps you can close yourself, close them.
Sources
- AICPA, TSP section 100, “2017 Trust Services Criteria for Security, Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality, and Privacy” (with revised points of focus 2022): par. .02-.05 (criteria structure and control design), par. .03-.04 (points of focus status, verbatim quotes), par. .11 (Type 1 vs Type 2), par. .13-.16 (commitments and system requirements), CC6.4 and CC6.8 criterion text. Accessed 19-08-2026 via full-text mirror of the AICPA publication (copyright 2017 AICPA, document 22099-349) at leaglobal.com; current edition listing confirmed on aicpa-cima.com, free account access, 19-08-2026 (per research record R26).
- Published SOC 2 reports quoting Trust Services Criteria text verbatim: metr.org 2025 SOC 2 Type 1 report; profisee.com 2024 Type 2 report. Accessed 19-08-2026 (per research record R26).
- Market practice (tier 2, named and dated, used for practice observations only, never as AICPA rules): soc2auditors.org SOC 2 controls list page (evidence and gap column format); scrut.io SOC 2 common criteria page (exception-risk triage); brightdefense.com SOC 2 controls list page (criteria vs controls vs points of focus definitions). All checked 19-08-2026 (per research record R27).
- Atoro supplied facts: positioning as an Irish AI governance and cyber compliance consultancy for software companies; first consultancy in Europe certified against ISO/IEC 42001, certificate AIMS-AT-120224, A-LIGN under ANAB; “more than 200 certifications delivered” (atoro.io, checked 08-08-2026).